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Abstract 
The ideational narrative power of law has now solidified, and continues to solidify,  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ? ? ŝŶƚŽ ĂŶ ĞŶƚŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ ůĞŐĂů ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? hŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ
either non-existent, or so broad as to be meaningless, or as existing only in relations between EU law 
ĂŶĚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ  ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶĚ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ? Žƌ ĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ Ă ďŽĚǇŽĨ ďĂƌĞůǇ Žƌ ůŽŽƐĞůǇ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
ĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐhŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁŝŶƚŽďĞŝŶŐŝƐĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ 
narration.  The ways in which EU health law is narrated (and continues to be narrated) involve three 
main groups of actors: the legislature, courts and the academy.   
 
Keywords: EU law, healthcare 
Introduction 
When Jean McHale and I began working on European Union (EU) health law in the mid 1990s, we 
were counselled by a senior colleague against our choice of research agenda.  ‘European Union 
health law  W ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂŶǇ ? ?he mused. Then he paused.  ‘ĐƚƵĂůůǇ ?/ďĞŐǇŽƵƌƉĂƌĚŽŶ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŚƵŐĞ ?ŝƐŶ ?ƚ
it? ? 
These responses  W the non-existence or vast and imprecise scope of EU health law  W remain 
pertinent today and show that the very object of inquiry in this paper is contested. Are EU health 
policies represented in, supported by, and implemented through specific and distinct legal 
arrangements? In simpler words, does EU health law exist? In 2004 (Hervey and McHale 2004) and 
as recently as 2010 (Hervey and Vanhercke 2010), the implicit assumption, in my work and that of 
others (Hatzopoulos 2002; Newdick 2006, 2009; Lamping and Steffen 2009; Mossialos et al 2010; 
Flear et al 2013, but see concluding chapter thereof), was that EU health law could be understood 
only ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ h ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ  ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶĚ ? ŽĨ ,Ğƌǀ Ǉ ĂŶĚ DĐ,ĂůĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? Žƌin a 
patchwork ŽĨůĞŐĂůƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ‘ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ “ďĞůŽŶŐ ?ƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ
ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?,ĞƌǀĞǇ
and Vanhercke 2010: 85). But Hervey and McHale (2015) develops a thematic analysis of EU health 
law. In other words, the assumption underpinning that monograph is that it is now the case that EU 
                                                          
*
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University of Copenhagen, October 2014; and my colleagues Pablo Castillo-Ortiz and Paul James Cardwell. The usual 
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health law should be seen as a distinct field of law or at least of legal enquiry (Hervey and McHale, 
2015: 6, 8, 30-70). But if it is now tenable that EU health law  ‘exists ?, how did it come into being? 
Discovering how EU health law came to be matters for several reasons. The structures and 
assumptions underpinning a body of law have consequences for the meanings and applications of 
legal rules. Legal rules determine obligations and entitlements in both private relationships, and, 
importantly in this context, relationships between individuals and public authorities, including 
bodies such as the institutions within national health systems, and those of the European Union. 
Legal rules may be  ‘constitutional ?, such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), or the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR); legislative, such as the Data Protection Žƌ WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ZŝŐŚƚƐ 
Directives; or administrative, such as a Commission Decision to grant European marketing 
authorization to a controversial new medical technology. To understand legal rules as part of a self-
referencing entity thought of as  ‘EU health law ?, with its own specific logics, is to understand them 
differently from rules that are understood as part of  ‘internal market law ?,  ‘human rights law ?, 
 ‘privacy law ?,  ‘innovation law ? and so on. /ƚĂůƐŽŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŝĨĂŶĞŶƚŝƚǇƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘hŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ
institutionalised into various settings, including policy, legal, and academic institutions, at EU and 
national levels (De Ruijter, 2016; Vollaard and Martinsen, 2016 in this issue). If we take seriously the 
idea that the rule of law is a key explanatory factor in European integration (Schiengold 1965; Stein 
1981; Weiler 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet 2010; Greer and Loblova 2016 in this issue), 
then the rule of law in EU health policy is no exception. 
 
Methodology 
This paper places narration at the heart of the processes that are understood to have led to the 
emergence of EU health law.  The telling of stories  ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƐĐƌŝƉƚƐ ? ?,ĂůůĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?) 
that contribute to shared beliefs and understandings of the world, its problems, and how to fix them 
is a feature of social constructivist political science accounts of EU integration and governance (eg 
Rosamond, 2000, 2003; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Risse, 2004, 2009; Risse, Jorgensen and Wiener 
2001).  Narration is also a significant aspect of legal methodologies: both in the academy and in legal 
practice.  The ways in which legal processes (or the threat of legal processes), in particular court 
proceedings, but also legislative processes, construct social facts into shared understandings, ideas, 
expectations, and truths  ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞpower of law ? (Feeley 2013: vi)) has long been reflected in 
sociological (eg Friedman 1977; Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979, Galanter 1983; Boyd White 1985; 
Cotterrell 1992: 102-36; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Gessner and Nelken, 2007), critical (eg de Sousa 
Santos 1985; Fitzpatrick 1997; Hunter, McGlynn, Rackley 2010) and traditional approaches to law. 
These include, for instance, those based on the common law inductive processes of deriving legal 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ƚŽůĚ ŝŶ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ůĂǁ ? ƚĞǆƚďŽŽŬƐ(such as 
Holland and Webb, 2013). As de Búrca and Walker (2007) and Cardwell and Hervey (2015) observe, 
this is also so in the case of EU law. Law here is understood not only as a mandate which guides 
behaviour, but also as a site for stories which give meaning to that behaviour. The two are 
interconnected in that, through processes of interpretation, the meaning determines the mandate. 
,ĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛmixed ? ‘ůĂǁ-in-ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ? approach. 
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The limits of this approach are the well-known limits of constructivist approaches in general.  
Constructivist accounts tend to suppress the relevance of agency, particularly the agency of non-
state actors, as an explanatory factor. They discount the importance of rationalist interest-based 
decision-making. They have also been accused (for instance by neo-realists) of being inappropriately 
optimistic (Cowles 2003). /ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂĚŽƉƚƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂ ‘ŵŝǆĞĚ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽlogy, some of 
these limits are mitigated by including elements of other approaches, in particular, a focus on three 
key groups of institutional actors, who interact through over-lapping networks of expertise.  
The strengths of a mixed approach, combining interests, institutions and ideas (Bache, George, 
Bulmer 2011: 63-4) compensate for the weaknesses of a single approach.  Law is above all things a 
text-based discipline, so in the context of a paper like this, a text-based approach is more 
appropriate than, for instance, a quantitative approach. For example, counting the numbers of 
ƌƵůŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞ:h ?ŽƌhŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŽŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ǁŝůůŶŽƚƌĞǀĞĂůŵƵĐŚ
about the ways in which the particular subject is understood  W the act of deciding what to count is 
an act of narration in and of itself.  And  W of course  W law occupies a particularly powerful ideational 
narrative space.  The scope for legal ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
relationships, obligations and entitlements differs from that for other narrations, because, 
ultimately, law is backed by the sanction of state-based power, for instance, to deprive of property 
or even liberty.  
 
dŚĞ ?ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ?ŽĨhŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁŝŶƚŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ 
The core argument of this paper is that EU health law has now been narrated into existence. Its 
agenda is to explore how this performative, discursive process unfolded and is unfolding. The 
narration has been, and continues to be, carried out by three key groups of narrators: those 
contributing to legislative processes but also determining law-making powers  ? “ƚŚĞlegislature ?ĂƐ
shorthand in this paper), the courts, and the academy.
i
  Another group, legal professionals, are also 
relevant, although their narrative tools in this area (it would be different in, for instance, commercial 
transactions law) have been focused on interactions with the legislature and, in particular, the 
courts, so they are not dealt with separately here. The groups of narrators form a networked 
community of expertise, with (at least some/sufficient) shared beliefs in both how legal problems 
are framed  ? ‘ƚŽůĚ ? ?, and consequently what legal solutions come to be understood as appropriate. 
The practical mechanisms of narration used by each of the three groups of narrators differ, 
contingent upon institutional constraints and dependencies. Their narratives may also differ to some 
extent. 
The EU is not a state. It is a body of constrained competence, so its legislature can act only where 
empowered to do so. Although the politically determined preferences of the EU legislature are 
undoubtedly relevant to the question of whether EU health law exists, the legal and indeed quasi-
constitutional opportunities and constraints under which those preferences are pursued are equally 
important. It follows that, for the purposes of this paper, the legislature is not understood solely 
through its formal legal meaning (the Commission, European Parliament and Council). It is also 
understood as including the governments of the Member States, which give the formal EU 
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legislature powers and competences through the legal basis provisions of the Treaties.
ii
  The 
governments of the Member States acting through Council also play a role in determining the 
interpretation ŽĨhŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĨƚůĂǁ ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
Council Conclusions.  
The textual changes through time to legal provisions, such as (now) Article 168 TFEU, are thus an 
important element of the story (Hervey and McHale 2004: 72-81; McKee, Hervey, Gilmore, 2010: 
235-240; Hervey and McHale 2015: 42-44, 61).  dŚĞhůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
and significance of its adopted acts are recounted through the binding text of the acts themselves; 
the preambles to those acts, which explain their rationale and intentions; and the preparatory 
documents that form part of the legislative process.  For instance, the text of early EU food labelling 
legislation refers only to the internal market as its rationale and aim.  But more recent EU food 
legislation is understood as promoting public health through reducing obesity, as part of EU health 
law.  TŚĞWĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ZŝŐŚƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝƐŵŽƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂƐ ĨĂůůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĞŶƚŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ
understood as EU health law. The preamble ƚŽƚŚĞWĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ZŝŐŚƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞbegins with Article 168 
TFEU, it refers ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶs on Common values and principles in European 
hŶŝŽŶ,ĞĂůƚŚ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƐƚĂƚĞĚĂŝŵŝƐ ‘ƚo establish rules for facilitating access to safe and high-
quality cross-border healthcare  ? to ensure patient mobility  ? and to promote cooperation on 
ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?h ?ƌĞĐŝƚĂů ? ? ? ? 
The ways in which law is understood through national legislative, administrative and judicial 
implementation or compliance practices is also an important element in articulating EU health law 
(Obermaier 2009).  Examples involving several EU Member States (Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, France Germany) of implementation of EU law on migrant 
ŝŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶMartinsen and Diaz-Asensio 2016 in this issue, Vollaard 2016 in 
ƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?ĂŶĚsĂƐĞǀ ?sƌĂŶŐďčŬ ?<ƎĞƉĞůŬĂ ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?  
The legal ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŽƌƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨďŽƚŚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇ ?ƐůĞŐĂůďĂƐŝƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
and EU legislation (Directives, Regulations) is a matter, ultimately, for courts.  The principal relevant 
court is the CJEU, using its interpretative jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU and its power to 
determine validity of EU law under Article 263 TFEU.  National courts and quasi judicial 
administrative authorities also play an important story-telling role (Martinsen and Diaz-Asensio 2016 
in this issue), including in relationships of constructive cooperation with the CJEU (Vasev, Vragbæk, 
<ƎĞƉĞůŬĂ ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?  A dynamic interaction between the CJEU and the EU legislature, which is 
in part based on a notion of the relationships between courts and legislatures in democratic 
societies, founded on the rule of law, forms a key part of the process of narrating EU health law into 
existence (Vollaard 2015; Vollaard and Martinsen 2016; Martinsen and Diaz-Asensio 2016 in this 
issue). So, for instance, the texts circulating during the processes of adoption ŽĨƚŚĞWĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ZŝŐŚƚƐ
ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĞǀĞŶďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ:h ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?, and then 
 ‘ƌĞƚĞůůŝŶŐ ?, its jurisprudence on free movement of patients in a different way from the way it 
recounts ƚŚĂƚũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŝŶ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚůĂǁ ?,ĂƚǌŽƉŽƵů ƐĂŶĚ,ĞƌǀĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
In some ways, the academy is the least important narrator of EU health law. It has no formal power 
to issue legally binding interpretations of law. Where its narratives depart from those of legislature 
and courts, we might therefore expect processes of narration to be less successful. But in other 
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respects, the academy is the most important interlocutor here. The academy is the discursive and 
performative site for articulating what is (and is not) a topic or subject for study. Moreover, the way 
that the academy understands the world is noƚ ũƵƐƚ  ‘ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ? ? /ƚ ŚĂƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů
implications, not only for research funding, for learning and teaching, and for academic 
appointments. The views of the legal academy have a long history of informing and even 
constituting the definitive meanings of legal texts  W in European contexts, dating back to medieval 
glosses on Roman law, and more recently where courts rely on academic interpretations of texts. 
Perhaps concrete material expressions of EU health law in the academy (Chair in EU Health Law; 
programmes in EU Health Law) would be the most convincing form of evidence for the argument 
made in this paper. The academy narrates EU health law through its dissemination activities 
(particularly its publications), and through its interactions with the legislature and the courts.  For 
instance, the work of scholars who understand those aspects of EU law that apply to medical 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨhŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ?ƐĞĞ ?ĞŐ ?&ůĞĂƌĞƚĂů  ? ? ? ?   ‘ƌĞ-readƐ ? legal instruments otherwise 
thought of as falling within areas of EU law such as internal market law, intellectual property or 
competition law (the Directive on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions; the Clinical Trials 
Directive; the Brüstle and International Stem Cell cases).  
To summarise. The ideational narrative power of law has now solidified, and continues to solidify, 
into an entity with a distinctive legal identity, an entity previously seen as either non-existent, or so 
broad as to be meaningless, ŽƌĂƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŽŶůǇ ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶh ůĂǁĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚ  ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶĚ ?
approach), or as consisting of a body of barely or lŽŽƐĞůǇĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐǇĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ?
approach).  The process has been executed (and continues to be executed) by three main groups of 
actors: the legislature, courts and the academy.  What are the constituent features of the processes? 
How did EU health law come to be? 
 
The processes of narration 
The processes through which EU health law has been (and continues to be) narrated include the 
following: 
(a) Articulation of distinctive principles and themes of EU health law 
(b) Expression of EU health law as structurally coherent 
(c) Understanding of the body of EU health law as special and distinctive 
These processes are not entirely separate, but overlapping and mutually reinforcing.  
(a) Discerning and Articulating Principles and Themes 
One of the already-noted principles of EU health law  W the principle of constrained competence  W is 
common to all areas of EU law. Every area of EU law, no matter how uncontested its existence, 
reflects the h ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƐ ?/ƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚhe definition of 
their health policy and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care and the 
ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? (Article 168 TFEU) are a matter for Member States, not 
the EU, is not evidence that EU health law cannot be understood as a meaningful field of law. 
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/ŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞhŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ
common substantive values, which have become regarded as the underpinning principles of EU 
health law. The values (Article 2 TEU) and aims (Article 1 TEU) of the EU, as expressed in its founding 
treaties ? ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ  ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?  ‘ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?  ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?  ‘ŶŽŶ-
ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁĞůů-ďĞŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ŽĨ ŐĞŶ ƌĂů
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŚĂǀĞĂ direct bearing on health, health systems, and health policy. 
These values, along with others such as individual (consumer) autonomy and regulatory protection 
from risk of harm, have also been articulated thematically (Hervey and McHale 2015). 
/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞh ?ƐŽƵŶĐŝůĂĚŽƉƚĞĚConclusions on Common values and principles in European Union 
Health Systems. The history of the Common values and principles lies in significant opposition to the 
proposed Directive on services in the internal market, contemporaneous with ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŽŶ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚthe (failed) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  The revised 
Directive explicitly excluded health care, and eventually the EU adopted a separate WĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ZŝŐŚƚƐ
Directive. Council has reiterated the Common values and principles in the h ?Ɛ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
Europe 2020.  In its 2011 Conclusions: Towards modern, responsible and sustainable health systems, 
Council calls on Member States and the European Commission to refocus health from being 
regarded as solely an expenditure, to being regarded as a contributor to economic growth (Kvist 
2015). The Common values and principles have been endorsed by both the European Commission 
(2007) and the European Parliament (2008), although not yet by the CJEU. 
The 2006 Council Common values and principles ƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŐŽŽĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇĐĂƌĞ ?
ĞƋƵŝƚǇĂŶĚƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂ ƐĞƚŽĨƐŚĂƌĞĚhǀĂlues that are applied to healthcare systems, 
and by implication, to health law. Although Council states that different Member States express 
these values differently in terms of practical reality, the Common values and principles go as far as to 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĂƐĞƚŽĨƐŚĂƌĞĚ ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĞǆƉ ĐƚĞĚƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞh ?
dŚĞƐĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂƌĞ  ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ĐĂƌĞ ? ?  ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ?  ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ-based and ethically robust 
ĐĂƌĞ ? ? ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ‘ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞ ƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇĨŽƌthe purposes of 
this paper, Council not only expresses these values and principles as shared among national health 
care systems, and, implicitly, the law that underpins them, but also calls upon the European 
Commission to ensure that these principles are followed when proposing health-specific EU 
legislation.  
Ɛ Ă ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ůĂǁ ? ? ƚŚĞCommon values and principles are not binding, but they form a 
persuasive interpretative source on which the CJEU may draw (Senden 2004), in interpreting and 
ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ŚĂƌĚůĂǁ ? ?Such hard law includeƐƚŚĞd&h ?Ɛ ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞǇ
require the EU institutions, when defining and implementing their policies and activities, to take into 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ  ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ůŝŶŬĞĚ ƚŽ  ? Ă ŚŝŐŚ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ  ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? (Article 9 TFEU; 
Article 168 (1) TFEU. See also Article 35 EU CFR). The TFEU is binding on the EU institutions when 
they adopt EU Health Law.
iii
 The Common values and principles are an interpretative guide as to the 
meaning of the mainstreaming duty, at least in the context of EU law pertaining to health systems, 
and arguably also pertaining to public health. Hence the Common values and principles are a credible 
expression of the principles and themes of EU health law.  
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The h ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ also express the principles and themes of EU health law. 
Originally EU law was devoid of explicit recognition for human rights. They first appeared ĂƐ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŽĨhůĂǁ ?dŚĞhŶŽǁŚĂƐŝƚƐŽǁŶŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ůĞŐĂůǀĂůƵĞĂƐ ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? (Article 6 (1) TEU). The EU CFR protects human dignity (Article 1), the 
right to life (Article 2), integrity of the person (Article 3), private life (Article 7), protection of 
personal data (Article 8), right to marry and found a family (Article 9), freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article 10) all of which have significance for EU health law (McHale 2010). In 
addition, the EU CFR provides for the rights of children (Article 24), the elderly (Article 25), and 
persons with disabilities (Article 26), three groups whose vulnerabilities mean that their rights need 
special attention in health contexts. TŚĞ h &Z ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ to 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝǀĞŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵŵĞĚŝĐĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
conditions (Article 35). The CJEU, and in particular its Advocates General, has referred to the EU 
&Z ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ care, when it interprets EU health law (Hervey 
and McHale 2015: 160-164; 169-176; 185-189; 202-210).  In so doing, the CJEU narrates those 
principles as expressing the framework within which it understands the relevant litigation  W 
expressing it as something distinct from other, more established, areas of EU law. 
Some commentators, including me, have expressed significant reservations as to the practical 
fulfilment of these principles, particularly those of solidarity and equity, but also those of human 
rights protection, within EU health law (Hervey 2003, McHale 2010). In particular, there is concern 
about the extent to which the free movement and fair competition provisions of EU internal market 
law, when they form part of EU health law, can ever support such principles (Hatzopolous 2002; 
Newdick 2006, 2009; McHale 2010; Hervey 2011). There is also concern over whether the quality of 
care principle is sufficiently fulfilled where EU health law seeks to support technological innovation 
(Flear et al 2013, Hervey and McHale 2015) ?^ŽŵĞŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ƚŚĞh ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ
competences in health. However, in the context of this paper, whether these Common values and 
principles, and the human rights expressed in the EU CFR, are honoured in every specific instance is 
not the point. What matters is the thematic  ‘ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƐĂŶ expression of the 
underlying principles of EU health law. The articulation and acceptance of the principles of EU health 
law, as comprising human rights protection, quality of care, patient safety, evidence-based and 
ethically robust care, patient involvement, redress, and privacy and confidentiality, within the 
context of constrained EU competences, is one process of narration of EU health law. It is an 
expression of the existence of EU health law, distinct from (although interacting or even overlapping 
with) other fields of EU law, or national health law, or global health law. 
 
(b) Expressing Structural Coherence 
However one measures its scope (for an inclusive approach see Hervey and McHale 2015), although 
EU health law is a body of law based on constrained EU competences, it nonetheless represents a 
sizeable body of legal texts. But mere volume is insufficient as evidence of the existence of EU health 
law.  What is needed is an account that makes sense of that body of legal texts in accordance with 
some kind of internal and self-referring structural coherence.  The articulation of the principles of EU 
health law (see above) goes some way to expressing such structural coherence. 
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However, as we already noted, the dominant metaphor, historically, for describing EU health law, 
ĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇhŚĞĂůƚŚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĂƚŽĨĂ ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ? ?ƐŚĐƌŽĨƚ ? ? ? ? ?'ƌĞĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?Hervey 
and Vanhercke 2010; Lamping and Steffen 2009). For instance, some of the earliest EU health 
legislation and court rulings consist in 1965 rules on marketing authorisation for pharmaceuticals, a 
1971 Regulation on the access of mobile workers and their families to health care in the Member 
State to which they have migrated for work, CJEU decisions from the mid 1970s on the question of 
whether intellectual property rights could justify restrictions on importation of pharmaceuticals, and 
1975 Directives on mutual recognition of dŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? /Ĩ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂǇ ? ƚŚĞ
implication is that EU health law is nothing more than ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ ůĂǁĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚĂƚ  ‘ďĞůŽŶŐ ? ŝŶ
different domains, in a way that makes no sense as a coherent story.
iv
  An argument against the 
existence of EU health lĂǁŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĨĂďƌŝĐ ?ŽĨĞĂĐŚĂƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞƌĞŽĨŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ
putting together the total is of a not-quite-complete and not-terribly-coherent whole: hence the 
 ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ?ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ? 
If one articulates the pieces of this  ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨhlaw with a longer 
pedigree, as in Hervey and McHale 2004, there is little evidence of structural coherence. Multiple 
areas of EU law are involved. For instance, and non-exhaustively, provisions on the recognition of 
ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞĂĐƌŽƐƐďŽƌĚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞh ?ŽŶ
access to health care of mobile workers and their families in another EU Member State; on patients 
accessing health care services across borders; on restrictions on health care providers setting up and 
offering their services in another Member State, fall within various areas of EU free movement law. 
Measures on the marketing and advertising of pharmaceuticals and medical devices fall within EU 
free movement, consumer protection and innovation law. Perhaps counter-intuitively, legislation on 
data protection also falls within EU free movement law. Special arrangements for the provision of 
health care services paid for by the public purse, through for instance granting exclusive licenses, 
authorisations or other restrictive measures to hospitals, clinics and other health care providers, at 
least potentially fall within EU competition law. Legislation on working conditions in hospitals falls 
within EU labour law. Provisions on development, authorisation and marketing of novel health 
technologies fall within EU innovation and free movement law. International treaty provisions and 
EU legislation on access to essential medicines across the globe fall within EU external relations law. 
Measures ensuring safety of food, as a major disease vector, or the regulation of sale, labelling and 
ĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĨŽŽĚ ? ƚŽďĂĐĐŽ ĂŶĚ ĂůĐŽŚŽů ? ŵĂũŽƌ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ůŝĨĞ-ƐƚǇůĞ ? ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƐ ? ĨĂůů ǁŝƚŚŝŶ h
external trade law, agricultural law, free movement law and consumer protection law. Air or water 
quality regulation falls within EU environmental law, as does road safety, which also falls within EU 
transport law. In addition, as already noted, provisions of EU  ‘constitutional ? law, on allocation of 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƐ ? ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ?ĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶhůĂǁ ?are also important, 
in terms of their implications for how the more detailed legislative provisions are both adopted and 
interpreted.  
Each of these different areas of EU law, through which EU health law has been developed 
historically, has its own trajectory, its own rationales and principles, as well as formal legal basis, and 
its own communities of expertise, with shared understandings of problems and their (legal) 
solutions. The pedigree of EU health law, as emerging from these areas and solidifying into a 
structurally coherent area relatively recently, forms part of the distinctive quality of EU health law, 
ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁŝŶĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞĞĚŐůŽďĂůŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ? 
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The key group of actors articulating EU health law as structurally coherent is the academy. Increasing 
numbers of legal academics interested in the EU and health, and those from other disciplines, have 
sought to express EU health law through its increasing structural coherence. One way in which the 
academy has told this story is to see EU health law as a new combination of one or more of these 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ ?ƐƚŚĞůŝƐƚĂďŽǀĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘already ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ?ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨhůĂǁďůƵƌŝŶƚŽ
one another, as is the case for free movement law and consumer protection law. The academy 
creaƚĞƐ ‘hŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?ĂƐĂŶĞǁďůĞŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƐŽĨhůĂǁ ?It has  ‘ƌĞ-ƌĞĂĚ ?ƐŽŵĞĞĂƌůǇh
health law texts, with hindsight, to understand them as part of this new field of legal enquiry, as well 
as of the pre-ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨh ůĂw. Thus, for instance, the 1984 CJEU ruling of 
Luisi and Carbone, to the effect that restrictions on currency movement, where the currency was to 
be used to pay for medical treatment, are prima facie contrary to EU law, or its 1991 Grogan ruling, 
to the effect that restrictions on abortion advertising are prima facie contrary to EU law, although 
may be justified, are ŶŽǁƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĞŵďŽĚǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞh ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŝƚƐŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
principles of human rights protection, quality of care, patient safety, evidence-based and ethically 
robust care, patient involvement, redress, and privacy and confidentiality, all within the context of 
constrained EU competences (Hervey and McHale 2015: 62-63, 161, 194).  At the time the decisions 
were taken, they were understood within the fields of EU internal market and constitutional law (eg 
Phelan 1992). 
Admittedly not every area of health law (either nationally or globally focused) is significantly covered 
by EU health law.  If we take the main areas of health law, as for instance understood by key health 
law texts from European countries (Westerhäll 1994; Nys 1994, 2012; Kennedy and Grubb 2000; 
Montgomery 2002; Mason and Laurie 2010; Rynning and Hartlev 2011; Brazier and Cave 2011; 
Madden 2012; Jackson 2014, Herring 2014; Pattinson 2014), we see some areas where EU law has 
no, or very little, relevance. These include, for instance, consent to treatment, end of life decision-
making, and resource allocation within national health systems. An objection to the argument that I 
am making in this paper is thus that EU health law is not sufficiently structurally coherent to 
constitute a distinct legal area, because it does not cover these areas on which the structural 
coherence of health law rests.  
But two observations may be made in response. First, in each of the areas of health law where EU 
law appears to have no relevance, there is some relevance. For sure, the prospects of harmonized 
EU level legal rules are remote. But the EU level is no longer entirely absent from legal structures. 
For example, questions of consent to treatment, or of beginning or end of life decision-making (Nys 
2001) may fall within the scope of the EU CFR, and are covered by EU law on biomedical research 
and human organ and tissue regulation. Questions of resource allocation within national health 
systems are covered by EU law on transparency of pharmaceuticals pricing, as well as indirectly by 
hůĂǁŽŶĨƌĞĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶhůĂǁďĞŝŶŐŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?ƚŚĞh ?ƐůĞŐĂl order has 
become one of the areas in which conflicting rights claims, or claims to resources, are adjudicated, 
even if those processes ŐŝǀĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶŽĨĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌŶĐĞƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ŵƵĐŚ
of the substantive content of health law is covered by EU health law, and increasingly so. As we 
suggested in 2004, the pattern or trajectory is for EU law to have relevance in ever more areas of 
health law.  The argument I am making here is that the trajectory has reached a stage of sufficient 
structural coherence ƚŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘hŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?.
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(c) Understanding EU Health Law as a Distinctive Body of Law 
At least until the 2000s and 2010s, EU health law occupied at best an uncertain position vis-à-vis EU 
internal market law.  EU ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇ ? ?^ĐŚĂƌƉĨ ? ? ? ? ? W the (contested) idea that 
social policies are constitutionally subservient to EU internal market law  W is at the heart of this 
uncertainty.  The logical consequence of the constitutional asymmetry position, as applied to EU 
health law, is that freedom of movement and competition are the rule; health protection or health 
promotion are at best exceptions. ^ŽŵĞ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ůĂǁ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ
central organising area of law, and that EU health law is not conceptually distinct from internal 
market law, but rather national health law is subservient to it (Hatzopoulos 2002, 2005; 
Montgomery 2005, Newdick 2006, 2011; Gekiere Baeten Palm 2010; Davies 2011).  But others 
(Hervey and Vanhercke 2010; Hervey 2011; Hervey 2008; (to some extent) Hancher and Sauter 
2012) ƐĞĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ůĂǁ ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ƌƵůĞ-ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ
hence express EU health law as more coherent and distinctive than before the 2000s.  EU health law 
is no longer understood as comprised of a series of unrelated exceptions to free trade rules, but 
rather as a distinctive legal area, with its own underlying principles and structural coherence. 
Some of the broader contexts within which the emergence of EU health law as a distinctive body of 
ůĂǁŚĂƐ ƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĞh ?Ɛ  ‘>ŝƐďŽŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ĨŽƌŐƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ (Copeland and 
Papadimitriou 2012, de Ruijter 2015) ?ĂƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ŶĞǁĂŶĚ
old) of the internal market (Hatzopoulos 2012); and the idea of health and other social capital not 
only as a matter of social rights or welfare, but also as a factor in a productive economy (Greer 2014, 
Kvist, 2015) or an element of macroeconomic conditionality (Baeten and Vanhercke 2016 in this 
issue).  Many of these ideas are reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, most prominently in the statement 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚĞĐŽŶ ŵǇ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ?dh ? ?dŚĞ:hŚĂƐ
increasingly articulated the idea that health systems occupy a distinctive position in internal market 
law (Hervey and McHale 2015, 227-246; 247-268; 269-291 elaborating the multiple ways in which 
the CJEU has given weight to the solidarity that underpins health systems rather than narrating 
ŚĞĂůƚŚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ƉůĂĐĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚůĂǁǁŝƚŚŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞĂŶĚĨĂŝƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ)  W to 
the extent that that position can be said to be part of the principles or structural coherence of EU 
health law.  dŚĞ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŝŶƉƌotecting the organisational structures and capacities 
of national health systems, and their financial viability, has been increasingly recognised by the CJEU, 
in cases concerning migration of patients, but also concerning migration of professionals, and novel 
business structures delivering aspects of health services, such as internet pharmacies, privately 
owned biomedical laboratories, and multinational hospital chains.  In doing so, the CJEU built on 
earlier jurisprudence which recognised the need to protect the financial viability of social security 
systems; rules about the organisation of health care professions, qualifications, and professional 
ethics; or consumer protection.  National courts, competition authorities and the CJEU have 
expressed the idea ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŶ h ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ ? ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ŽĨ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?Similarly, both the CJEU and the EU legislature have explicitly recognised 
in public procurement law that health systems do not operate entirely within ordinary markets. 
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IŶƚĞƌŶĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐhas existed since the 
foundation of the internal market. Obvious examples are legislation covering pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, and products that are harmful to health (in particular tobacco, but also food and 
alcohol). Again, the way that this legislation is understood to fit within the scheme of EU law has 
changed over time. dŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ 2001 review of its pharmaceuticals regulation, 
involving stakeholders from health policy communities, not only from industry, and involving DG 
Sanco and DG Markt, led to a significant amendment of the EU pharmaceuticals legislation in 2004.  
dŚĞ  ‘ƌĞ-ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ ƉŚĂƌŵĂĐĞƵƚŝĐĂůƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůy a matter of internal market law is a 
strong example of the emerging greater distinctiveness of EU health law. The proposed amendments 
to EU medical devices regulation are another example; as is EU regulation of tobacco and alcohol.  
The idea of health as a factor in a productive economy (Greer 2014), related to internal market law, 
the Lisbon Agenda and now Europe 2020, is reflected in various aspects of EU law.  A particularly 
good example is EU law on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which seeks to promote industry 
innovation (Flear et al 2013).  EU law and policy on health-related research involves investment in 
research into novel health products or processes, as well as into health system reform.  The EU 
invests in health infrastructure through its cohesion funds (Clemens et al 2013).  Some aspects of 
this element of the distinctiveness of EU health law may at least appear to run against some of its 
underlying principles, such as equality.  Whether that is the case or not (Hervey and McHale 2015), 
the underlying idea of health as a productive factor has the effect of enhancing the cohesiveness of 
EU health law as a distinctive body of law. 
 
Conclusions 
WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘h ŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĂǁ ? ŶŽǁ ĞǆŝƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ
publishing this paper(!). In other words, if the academy and the legal profession (broadly 
understood, as including legislatures, courts and those who practise law), were sure that the notion 
of  ‘hŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ?ǁĞƌĞďĞǇŽŶĚĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞƚƚǇĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂŶĚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůĞŐĂů
arrangements support EU health(care) policies. A body of law is understood as autonomous and 
distinct as a consequence of the performative effects of the discourses of relevant actors who 
consider it to be so. Very few people would ŶŽǁƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘hůĂǁ ?Žƌ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚůĂǁ ? ?ŽƌĨŽƌ
ƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ůĂǁ ? ?Žƌ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ůĂǁ ? ?ŝƐĂŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůĐŽĐĞƉƚ ? dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ about the 
scope of those entities (see, eg, Barnard and Odudu 2009; and the discussion in Hervey and McHale 
2015: 10-29; 53-55), and about their intellectual trajectory (see eg, re EU law, Cardwell and Hervey 
2015; de Witte 2009; Arnull 2008; Walker 2005; Shaw 1996) but very rarely about their very 
existence. (There is a thoughtful discussion of exceptions to that rule concerning health law in Ruger 
2008, Hall 2008).  That is not the case for EU health law.  Its very existence remains contested. 
But the argument advanced in this paper is that those who are sceptical should no longer be so.  
Through their narrative accounts, the EU legislature, courts and the legal academy have 
created/constructed EU health law.  They have done so, and continue to do so, through articulation 
of principles and themes of EU health law, and expression of EU health law as structurally coherent, 
special and distinct from other areas of law.  The distinctive features of EU health law include a weak 
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(but not a strong, as is sometimes claimed) consumerizing effect on health policies; a rhetorical 
attention to (human) rights, with some consequences for procedural entitlements; respect for the 
solidarity and equality bases of national health systems; and context-specific approaches to risk 
(Hervey and McHale 2015, summarized at 544-546). 
Telling stories about EU health law matters in academic contexts; in the ways in which legal texts are 
enacted, adopted, and implemented; and in the ways courts interpret them.  Whether a body of law 
such as EU health law is understood to exist in a meaningful sense also matters in the non-legal 
world.  Law not only has narrative power; it also has material power, to alter relationships between 
human beings and institutions.  The stories we tell about law affect its very meaning, in that they 
inform the interpretative acts of applying legal texts to concrete situations, determining obligations 
and entitlements, powers and constraints.  The important questions now are not so much about 
how EU health law came to be  W they are about its meaning and significance.  
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i
 I note the self-reflexive nature of this paper, in that I am very much part of the academy on which the paper reflects. 
ii
 /ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĚĞƉĂƌƚƐĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ
empowered to adopt laws within a legal system. 
iii
 Technically, if the EU institutions were to adopt legislation or take decisions contrary to the mainstreaming principle, 
those measures would be subject to judicial review under Articles 263 or 267 TFEU. In fact, the CJEU has never held a 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ?ĚƵƚǇ ?ĂŶĚI am unaware of any judicial review claim brought 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞh ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽƌďŽĚŝĞƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚĂŶhůĂǁŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽensure a high level of health 
protection. One staff case, Case F-64/06 S v European Parliament OJ C 199 from 25.08.2007, p.53; removed from the 
register OJ C 223 from 30.08.2008, p.63, which settled out of court, included the argument that a reassignment in the place 
of work from Rome to Brussels of an ill person constituted a breach of Article 35 EUCFR. 
iv
 This might well be the case for many other areas of EU law, for instance EU external relations law. 
